

Trusteer Rapport  
Malware Assessment Using Banking  
Trojans

March 15<sup>th</sup> 2012



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## Executive Summary

Trusteer contracted Mandiant to perform a security assessment of Rapport, a client software security solution. The purpose of this assessment was to see how Rapport performed against 25 Trojans that steal financial-based credentials from a victim. The tests were conducted on a non-virtualized computer network connected to the Internet. All tests were carried out in Mandiant's lab using Mandiant equipment. The victim machine was a non-virtualized 32-bit Windows 7 machine. Additional details of the test environment are detailed below. During February 2012, Mandiant independently collected all malware samples used for testing as described below. The final test of Trusteer Rapport took place on March 1, 2012.

## Results

Trusteer Rapport neutralized<sup>1</sup> all 25 banking Trojans tested by Mandiant. Trusteer did not have access to the malware before Mandiant performed the test. Rapport remained functional after each malware test.

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<sup>1</sup> Neutralized means that the malware is blocked, terminated and not started again on system reboot.

## About Rapport

Mandiant tested Trusteer Rapport Emerald Build 1108.70. Rapport was connected to the Internet, so that it could update its configuration if needed.

Additional information about the Rapport product is found at:

- <http://www.trusteer.com/product/trusteer-rapport>

## Malware

### Origin of Malware

Mandiant's malware analysis team has an extensive collection of labeled and organized malicious code samples. For malware samples not found in the Mandiant collection, Mandiant reached out to its extensive list of contacts within the private and public sectors of the security community. Mandiant works with two large organizations that have access to millions of labeled samples.

All samples were obtained during February 2012. Trusteer did not have access to the malware before Mandiant performed the test.

### Malware Validation

Mandiant analyzed all 25 malware samples prior to conducting any test of the Rapport security tool. There are two reasons for performing analysis before the test:

1. To confirm the family of each malware sample.
2. To determine the malware's network- and host-based indicators.

Network- and host-based indicators help Mandiant validate the success or failure of individual tests of Trusteer Rapport. These indicators are checked before each test to confirm that the malware was installed properly without Rapport installed. These indicators are checked again during a test to see if the Rapport successfully neutralizes the malware.

Network-based indicators: This includes beacon packets and DNS requests. These indicators are discovered using Wireshark.

Host-based indicators: This consists of live memory byte signatures in the form of YARA signature. YARA<sup>2</sup> is a malware analysis tool that allows you to quickly scan live memory to find evidence of active malware on a host.

### Malware Samples

For the assessment, Mandiant selected 5 of the most common Trojans that attack the browser in an attempt to steal a user's financial information.

#### Zeus

Zeus is a Trojan that steals banking information via keylogging and form grabbing. It is spread by phishing schemes and deceptive browser pop-ups. Zeus has infected millions of machines worldwide. Zeus has had two major revisions which are classified here as Zeus1 and Zeus2.

#### SpyEye

SpyEye is a banking Trojan similar to Zeus. It captures keystrokes, performs form grabbing, and sends the captured data to a remote attacker. SpyEye is notable for its ability to inject new fields into a webpage.

#### Bugat

Bugat is a banking Trojan that targets Internet Explorer and Firefox browsers to harvests information from victims during online banking sessions.

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<sup>2</sup> <http://code.google.com/p/yara-project/>

### Carberp

Carberp is a banking Trojan that hooks network function calls within WININET.DLL to monitor browsing activities on an infected system. It covertly launches by injecting into common Windows processes like explorer.exe and svchost.exe to launch its main functionality.

### Shylock

Shylock is a banking Trojan that steals users credentials. It is packaged with many hiding mechanisms to avoid anti-virus detection.

The following table lists the 25 samples collected and used for the test:

Malware Name	MD5 Checksum	Size
Bugat.A	7802ff069a31dbebcdfbfc0858788aa2	53760
Bugat.B	e92de5cc06a361575d24adbde4bf0e81	186609
Carberp.A	f27e1e157b3964544aeb58b4de2cbe54	154112
Carberp.B	2b36b49baec741ba8e82ae32dca19906	92160
Carberp.C	4797452fc398ed98dc3b862e3d312865	462848
Shylock.A	a8ff900f5f3134a1f04d9217ab2d5dd0	385592
Shylock.B	598621d8fbc21d766b6f416823df2db9	167936
Shylock.C	9e49bc5d094906d43b22d8fd677fe633	167936
Shylock.D	d212e1c4c69ac9cc49b37105b31715d3	167936
SpyEye.A	df04c2cd2b5f7e471cb0435fdb9b3014	115200
SpyEye.B	2dd9f7a8235fd17b33029b1471fb054a	181760
SpyEye.C	d69b970afe781b385b9c4856dd1690ea	134656
SpyEye.D	c38ae7bddb66c01af896f47bd27666ef	290816
SpyEye.E	81b2eb00c162d35299f4ba5ad8298541	307200
Zeus1.A	d030e469eb57187b051e06dd32429235	47104
Zeus1.B	772bfaa05a24fa07fe4c9a671984b0ed	45056
Zeus1.C	82a9679951d0afeeb7d7de659b9ca7b3	44032
Zeus1.D	cd0d3e4d6377729263419d558937b684	44544
Zeus1.E	9a66c30a771874314ec105be5e3b0972	51200
Zeus1.F	9a66c30a771874314ec105be5e3b0972	45056
Zeus2.A	90f22b1876df149aee86d3eb3ee16b84	42496
Zeus2.B	5576c826d454b69ade7617f1cb228de0	1882624
Zeus2.C	ffa8bcce9732db6d47e50f7715d10562	230912
Zeus2.D	29b906dfbc0783225ea68286673cb52f	152576
Zeus2.E	734a1f720d3d64b1f1bd53b9afc738aa	159232


**Table 1 – List of 25 samples used for testing Rapport**

## Methodology

Mandiant set up a dedicated testing network and connected it directly to the Internet. All malware samples were validated prior to testing as described in the previous section.

### Network

The Mandiant test network consisted of two workstations setup as seen in the following diagram:



**Figure 1 – Mandiant malware assessment network**

The two machines consist of a router machine ❶ and victim machine ❷ connected to the Internet.

The router machine ❶ runs Windows 7 (64-bit) and is dual homed: one interface is connected to the Internet and the other is directly connected to the victim machine. The router machine acts as a router for the victim machine to access the Internet. The router machine runs HMA! Pro VPN<sup>3</sup> which allows the test network to remain anonymous on the Internet. HMA! Pro VPN hides the IP address of the router machine and encrypts all of its network traffic. This connection is shared with the victim machine. The router machine runs Wireshark to capture all network traffic leaving or destined for the victim machine. This enables Mandiant to quickly see the network-based indicators of active malware on the victim machine.

The malware is run on the victim machine ❷. This machine runs Windows 7 (32-bit) and has only Trusteer Rapport installed for malware protection. The victim machine was re-imaged after each test using PING<sup>4</sup> (Partimage Is Not Ghost). PING is a live Linux ISO that enables Mandiant to quickly

<sup>3</sup> <http://hidemyass.com/vpn/>

<sup>4</sup> <http://ping.windowsdream.com/>

reimage the victim machine after each test. The victim machine has Python and YARA installed. YARA is a malware analysis tool that allows us to quickly scan live memory to find evidence of active malware on the victim machine.

Wireshark and YARA provide us two ways to quickly detect malware activity. The majority of the malware samples used in this test had solid network-based indicators and live memory signatures to identify active samples. Neither Wireshark nor YARA interfere with how malware operates on the victim machine.

## Test Workflow

Before Rapport Installation:

1. Launch malware on victim machine
2. Confirm malware network- and host-based indicators are seen with YARA and Wireshark
3. Re-image the victim machine using PING
4. Repeat 1-3 for each of the 25 malware samples

With Rapport Installed:

1. Launch the Rapport console to confirm that it is running
2. Launch malware on victim machine
3. Check to see if Rapport reports or logs the infection
4. See if Rapport neutralizes the malware by looking for network- and host-based indicators
5. Confirm that Rapport and the system are still functional
6. Re-image the victim machine using PING
7. Repeat 1-3 for each of the 25 malware samples

## Final Results

The results are shown in the following table:

Malware Name	Neutralized?
Bugat.A	Success
Bugat.B	Success
Carberp.A	Success
Carberp.B	Success
Carberp.C	Success
Shylock.A	Success
Shylock.B	Success
Shylock.C	Success
Shylock.D	Success
SpyEye.A	Success
SpyEye.B	Success
SpyEye.C	Success
SpyEye.D	Success
SpyEye.E	Success
Zeus1.A	Success
Zeus1.B	Success
Zeus1.C	Success
Zeus1.D	Success
Zeus1.E	Success
Zeus1.F	Success
Zeus2.A	Success
Zeus2.B	Success
Zeus2.C	Success
Zeus2.D	Success
Zeus2.E	Success

**Table 2 – Rapport Test Results**

Trusteer Rapport neutralized<sup>5</sup> all 25 malware samples tested by Mandiant. Rapport notified the user or logged the exact name of the Trojan in the vast majority of the tests. Rapport remained fully functional after each malware test.

<sup>5</sup> Neutralized means that the malware is blocked, terminated and not started again on system reboot.

## About Mandiant

Mandiant provides industry leading information security services to help our customers overcome their most challenging problems. Our team is equally adept at building strong programs that minimize disturbances as well as helping clients rapidly respond to incidents and resume business. Our services are a blend of proactive efforts required to build secure network environments as well as reactive services that enable you to respond to events and intrusions in a timely and effective manner.

Mandiant has extensive experience in dealing with malware. As one of the largest incident response organizations, Mandiant has analyzed thousands of pieces of malware, ranging from targeted malware as used by the APT to non-targeted malware such as the financial malware included in the scope of this engagement. Mandiant has a dedicated team of malware analysts. The members of this group are responsible for tracking, reverse engineering, and analyzing malware; and conducted this test.

## Appendix A – Example Test Flow

The following is an example of a single malware test. In this instance, we used `SpyEye.A` (described in Table 1). We start with a clean baseline image (32-bit Windows 7) with Rapport installed.

1. We launch the Rapport console to confirm that it is running and up to date as seen in Figure 2. “Rapport is running” and “no” pending updates are seen in the console. We also check that the machine has a valid connection to the Internet by launching a web browser.



**Figure 2 – Active Rapport console**

2. Next, we launch `SpyEye.A` as an administrator user on the victim machine.
3. We wait a short amount of time to see if Rapport reports or logs the infection. After a short duration we see the alert “Trusteer Rapport detected and blocked SpyEye malware” as seen in Figure 3. Rapport is requesting a system reboot, so we click “Restart Computer Now” to force a system reboot.



**Figure 3 – Rapport alerting on SpyEye and requesting to reboot**

4. After the system reboot, we check to see if Rapport prevented the malware from launching by looking for network- and host-based indicators. We don't see any network traffic in Wireshark from *SpyEye.A*. We also scan live memory using our Yara signatures and we don't find any of our host-based signatures for *SpyEye.A*. We conclude that Rapport prevented the *SpyEye.A* malware from running on the system.
5. Next, we confirm that Rapport and the system are still functional by launching the console and launching a web browser on the local system.
6. Finally, we re-image the victim machine using PING so that we can start with a clean baseline image for the next malware test.